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NOTES
MUTUALITY OF REMEDY IN PENNSYLVANIA
The facts of the case of Heights Land Co. v. Swengel's Estate et al.,
179 Ail. 431, (Pa., 1935) appear to be that the plaintiff entered into a
contract to convey lands to the defendants' testatrix for an agreed price
to be paid in installments. The defendants' testatrix made no payment
other than the part payment made at the time of signing. About a year
after her death, and almost eight years after her first default in payment,
the plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit for the recovery of the balance
of the purchase price. The court, in the course of its opinion, said:
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.. ..... A contract to be enforced specifically must be mutual both as
to remedy and as to obligation; ...... .where a contract is incapable of being
specifically enforced against one party to it, that party is incapable of enforcing
it against the other".
Thus, once again, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pronounces the
time-worn, discredited, and generally discarded, doctrine of mutuality ot
remedy as applied in cases of specific performance. The doctrine is one
based on nothing but "notions of expediency".2 Mr. Justice Cardozo has
said: "The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable remedy
to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to petrify at the cost
of its animating principle". 8
There have been four principal statements of the doctrine in the
development of the law of mutuality of remedy. The first of these was
declared in 1848 by Fry who stated the doctrine to be that in order for
the plaintiff to obtain specific performance, the contract must be mutual,
that is, such that it might, "at the time it was entered into", have beern
enforced by either party against the other. 4 The rule as laid down by Fry
has been qualified by so many exceptions, that it can be said to have been
virtually abandoned as a principle to be followed.6  Dr. Pomeroy's view
of the true doctrine was that, if, when the bill is filed, the contract is still
IThe phrase, mutuality of remedy, seems to have come into the law of specific per-
formance as a phrase to explain an apparent extension of equity jurisdiction, and later apoears to
have gotten twisted and inverted into a phrase to limit and restrain equity jurisdiction.
Schofield. Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity, 807. Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12,
.18 At. 979; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root,
56 Kan. 187, 42 Pac. 715; Bacon v. Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 373# 382, 25 S. W.
747; Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N.H. 248, 9 At. 626; Lamprey v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co. et
al., 89 Minn. 187, 94 N. W. 555; Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 15 N.W. 409; "Many
courts, however, have recognized the injustice of denying specific performance if the
situation of the parties be such that reciprocity exists at the time the remedy is invoked,
and exceptions have been made until the exceptional doctrine has largely superseded the
rule." Zelleken et al. v. Lynch et al., 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563.
2 Lamprey v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co., et al., 89 Minni 181, 94 N. W. 555..
SEpstein v. Glucken, 233 N. Y, 490, 135 N. E, 861,
4 Fry, Specific Performance, 5th ed. 231; 6th ed. 219.
5 Montgomery Traction Co. v. Montgomery Light, etc., Co., 229 Fed. 672 (Where per-
formance on both sides is concurrent, specific performance decreed); Clayton v. Ashdown,
9 Vin. Abr. 393 (G. 4) pl. 2 (Infant, after reaching majority, may have specific perfor-
mance even though he could plead infancy in an action against him); Record v. Little-
field, 218 Mass. 483, 106 N. E. 142; Smith v. Wilson, 160 Mo. 657, 61 S. W, 597; Krah
v. Wassmer, 75 N. J. Eq. 109, 71 At. 404 (Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance
of a contract in writing signed by defendant under the statute of frauds even though the defen-
dant could not have specific performance by reason of plaintiff's not having -signed it). For
other exceptions see Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 I1. 403, 37 N. E. 73; Topeka Water Supply
Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 Pac. 715; Bacon & Co. v. Moody. 117 Ga. 207, 43. S. E. 482.
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executory, and the defendant, free from fraud or other personal bar, could
not obtain specific enforcement, he will not be ordered to perform.6 Pro-
fessor Ames expresses the rule as being to the effect that if, after the
defendant performs, his only remedy, in case of the plaintiff's non-per-
formance, would be the common law remedy of damages, specific per-
formance will be denied.7 Finally, Cardozo, J., lays down the following
broad principle: "What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the
assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or
oppression either to plaintiff or to defendant". 8 Referring to the doctrine,
he says: "If there ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy existing, not
merely at the time of the decree, but at the time of the formation of the
contract, is a condition of equitable relief, it has been so qualified by
exceptions, that, viewed as a precept of general validity, it has ceased to
be a rule today".
Considering the various statements of the doctrine in connection
with the facts of the instant case, it will be noted that, even though we
accept the doctrine of mutuality as sound, it was wrongly applied by the
court. The result cannot be justified even under Fry's rule, because, although
the defendant could not have obtained specific performance at the time
of the suit, as the defendant had committed a breach by default in pay-
ment, the contract, so far as the facts indicate, was such "at the time
it was entered into" that either party could have then obtained specific
performance. 9  The facts do not warrant the application of Pomeroy's
rule, because, "at the time of filing the bill in equity",l 0 the defendant
had committed a breach of the contract and was guilty of liches and
therefore was not free from personal bar-these being the only reasons
why the defendant could not obtain specific enforcement in this case.
The result of the case would be otherwise under Professor Ames' view.
The defendant, after performance, would not be limited to the common
gPomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence. vol. 4 sec. 1405.
7 Ames, Lectures on 1,egal Hist., 370.
gEpstein v. Glucken, 233 N. Y. 490. 135 N. E. 861.
SFry, in se. 440. states: "The mutuality of a contract, as we have seen is to be judged
of at the time it is entered into; so that it is no objection to the plaintiff's right that
the defendant may by delay, or other conduct on his part subsequent to the contract,
have lost his right against the plaintiff . . . If such a defense were sustained, it would be
to allow the defendants to take advantage of their own neglect." Ochs et al. v. Kramer et al.,
107 S. V. 260, (Ky.).
101n Heights Land Co. v. Swengel's Estate et al., the action is assumpsit, but is treated
as a bill in equity insofar as equitable principles are concerned, by reason of the fact that
"under our (Pa.) blended system of law and equity" actions for the recovery of purchase
price are properly brought in a court of law. Heights Land Co. v. Swengel's Estate et 21., 171
Ad. 431. 43Z.
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law remedy of damages, since delivery of the deed and payment would
be concurrent acts, and the defendant could thus be assured of perform.
ance by the plaintiff. Applying Cardozo's rule no "injustice or oppres
sion" would result to the defendant because the defendant is then re-
ceiving what was contracted for.
It is submitted that the court should rid itself of a rule such as this
-a rule without foundation-and that where one seeks specific enforce-
ment of a contract, "if there is no other good reason why it should not
be enforced except the want of mutuality of remedy, it will be so enforced","
John A. Cherry
THE TERMINATION OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
The Pennsylvania cases on this subject are comparatively few in
number, and the rules set down, while not inaccurate, are stated loosely.
This is accounted for by the fact that agreements of separation between
husband and wife are seldom used in Pennsylvania due to the fact that
the husband is compelled by statute to support his wife.
Before citing cases to illustrate the rules, it would be well to define
a separation agreement and point out the differences between it and a post-
nuptial property settlement. It is this latter form of contract which has
caused the courts much confusion in this regard. In general, the usual
separation agreement provides that the husband shall pay a certain amount
to the support of the wife during the separation, and the terms of such a
contract are, in the main, executory. On the other hand, a postnuptial
property settlement has to do with the dividing of property and property
interests between husband and wife. There is no question of the validity of
such an agreement of separation, both before and after the Act of June 8
1893,1 if made in contemplation of an immediate or an inevitable separa-2
tion.2 Neither is there any question of the validity of a postnuptial proper-
llI.amprey v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co. et .al,. 89 Minn. 187, 94 N. W. 555.
21Married Women's Property Act, P. L. 344.
2Fennell's Estate, 207 Pa. 309; Rodenbaugh v. Rodenbaugb, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 419.
